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NOTES
PROCREATIVE LIBERTY AND THE
PREEMBRYO PROBLEM:
DEVELOPING A MEDICAL AND LEGAL
FRAMEWORK TO SETTLE THE
DISPOSITION OF FROZEN
PREEMBRYOS
INTRODUCTION
The first child conceived through in vitro fertilization ("IVF')
was born in 1978. Since that first birth, the prevalence of IVF has
grown significantly, with 65,000 patients treated at over 300 United
States clinics in one year alone.' IVF is a treatment for infertility in
which ova harvested from a woman are combined with sperm in a
culture dish.2 If fertilization is successful, then the resulting preem-
bryo3 grows in culture for a few days before it is transferred to the
woman's uterus with the hope that the preembryo will implant in the
uterine lining and result in a successful pregnancy and birth.4
Egg donors are typically administered ovulation-stimulating hor-
mones at the beginning of IVF to increase the number of ova avail-
able for harvesting, from one or two to as many as several dozen.5
Even if all of these eggs are fertilized, they cannot be implanted in
1 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION Er AL, 1996 ASSISTED REPRO-
DUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC RE-
PORTS 1, 6 (1998), at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/archivelart96.
2 JENNIFER GUNNING & VERONICA ENGLISH, HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: A CASE
STUDY IN THE REGULATION OF MEDICAL INNOVATION 2 (1993).
3 Fertilization initially creates a zygote. When this zygote divides and reaches between
two to eight cells it becomes a preembryo. The preembryo does not become an embryo until it
is implanted in the uterus and divides to become more than 16 cells. John A. Robertson, In the
Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REv. 437, 441-43 (1990). Many
commentators, however, use the term "embryo" interchangeably with "preembryo."
4 See GUNNING & ENGLISH, supra note 2, at 2.
5 See GEOFFREY SHER ET AL, IN VIRo FERTILI7ATION: THE A.R.T. OF MAKING BABIES 49
(1995).
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one cycle of IVF because of the health risks a high order multiple
pregnancy presents to the developing fetuses and the woman carrying
them.6 Cryopreservation allows these surplus preembryos to be pre-
served in liquid nitrogen for future use instead of being destroyed
immediately.7 While cryopreservation facilitates IVF by reducing the
number of times a woman has to undergo egg retrieval and allowing a
woman to have a genetic child even after eg production ceases, it
creates some difficult legal and ethical issues. Cryopreservation al-
lows storage of the preembryos for up to twenty years in some cases, 9
creating a large time gap between the actual disposition of the preem-
bryos and the initial IVF procedure. During this gap, a couple who
agreed at the initiation of the procedure when and how to use the sur-
plus preembryos may face subsequent circumstances, such as divorce,
that leave them at odds over the disposition of their frozen preem-
bryos.
The courts must then decide whether a frozen preembryo should
be implanted, making the opposing spouse an unwilling parent, or
destroyed, denying the other spouse a chance at genetic parenthood.
This dilemma has arisen several times over the past decade, and will
likely continue to arise given the widespread use of IVF. State courts
in Tennessee, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Washing-
ton have all declined to compel implantation against the wishes of an
unwilling spouse. However, the courts have used diverse and incon-
sistent reasoning in reaching these decisions. Each decision also
seemed to imply that compelled implantation could be possible in
certain circumstances. The current state of uncertainty and inconsis-
tency in the law makes it difficult for a couple contemplating IVF to
definitively understand their rights with respect to stored preembryos
in the event of a divorce.
6 JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., NAT'L CTR FOR HEALTH STAT., SERIES 21, No. 55, VITAL
HEALTH STATISTICS, TRIPLET BIRTHS: TRENDS AND OUTCOMES, 1971-94, at 1, 10 (1997). A
high order multiple gestation is one of triplets or greater.
7 See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECH-
NOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 81 (1998). The task force
described the multi-step protocol for preembryo preservation. The first step in the process is the
protection of preembryos "from the formation of damaging ice crystals by replacing the cells'
watery interior with a cryoprotectant solution." Id. Next the preembryos are loaded into straws
containing a small amount of liquid nitrogen. Computers then regulate the very slow freezing of
this liquid nitrogen. The straws containing the frozen preembryos are finally stored in a large
canister of liquid nitrogen. The storage straws can be removed from the canister when a couple
is ready to implant the preembryo. Once removed from storage, the preembryos are "gradually
warmed" and cultured in preparation for an implantation attempt. Id.
8 See id. at 81-82. See also Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous
Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 59
(1999) (providing a general history of embryo cryopreservation).
9 See R.G. Edwards & Helen K. Beard, Destruction of Cryopreserved Embryos: UK Law
Dictated the Destruction of3000 Cryopreserved Human Embryos, 12 HuM. REPROD. 3 (1997).
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This Note will first present the legal history of preembryo dis-
putes between divorcing couples with an overview of the five state
court decisions addressing this issue. Next, this Note will critique the
two approaches used by the courts in deciding these cases. This cri-
tique of the balancing test and prior disposition approach will estab-
lish that these frameworks of analysis leave no room for an individual
desiring implantation to overcome the opposition of the other gamete
donor. This Note will finally propose that the legislature adopt a uni-
form standard for informed consent with the goals of (1) limiting dis-
putes by fully informing infertility patients of their legal rights and
responsibilities before they begin treatment, and (2) protecting the
interests of individuals with a strong desire for genetic parenthood by
allowing them to choose treatment options giving one person sole
discretion over the implantation of preembryos. The detailed consent
and storage regulations of European countries will serve as guidelines
in developing this uniform standard of consent.
I. BACKGROUND
The first widely publicized case involving a divorced couple with
conflicting desires about preserved preembryos arose in Tennessee.
The couple in Davis v. Davisl° created and stored nine preembryos
while the marriage was still intact." Shortly after a failed attempt at
implantation, the wife asked for control of the preembryos during di-
vorce proceedings initiated by the husband.12 At that time she wanted
to implant the preembryos in her own uterus and carry a pregnancy to
term. The husband opposed the implantation of the preembryos, as
he did not want to have a genetic child outside of marriage.1 4 The trial
court awarded the preembryos to the wife, classifying the preembryos
as children and finding that it would be in their best interest to be im-
planted and brought to term. 
15
The husband appealed the decision. The court of appeals found
that the trial court had incorrectly classified the preembryos as chil-
dren and reclassified them as property. 16 The court found that the
husband and the wife held a joint interest in the preembryos just as
they would have in any other marital property. 17 The court also ana-
lyzed the problem from a constitutional angle, "finding that Junior
'0 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
" Id. at592.
12 Id. at 589.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 id
17 Id.
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Davis ha[d] a 'constitutionally protected right not to beget a child
where no pregnancy has taken place' and... 'there is no compelling
state interest to justify ordering implantation against the will of either
party.'
' 18
Mary Sue Davis appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of
Tennessee. By then, both she and her ex-husband had remarried. 19
She no longer wanted to implant the preembryos herself, but wanted
to donate them to a childless couple.2° Junior Davis continued to op-
pose the implantation of the preembryos.2 t
The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the classification of the
preembryos as people or property and instead adopted the view of the
American Fertility Society that the preembryos "occupy an interim
category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential
for human life."22 The court stated that a prior disposition agreement
should be the "starting point" in resolving these disputes. 23 The Davis
couple, however, had not signed such an agreement; therefore, the
court ultimately decided the case by balancing the husband's right to
avoid procreation with the wife's right to procreate. The court found
in favor of the husband, holding that "the party wishing to avoid pro-
creation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable
possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than the use of the
preembryos in question." 24 The court emphasized that its holding did
not "contemplate the creation of an automatic veto" for the party
wishing to avoid procreation, but rather that an argument in favor of
the person desiring procreation should be considered if there were no
other alternatives to using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy.25
This decision leaves open the possibility of a ruling in favor of a per-
son who has become infertile since the original treatment and desires
to use, rather than donate, the preembryos.
The same issue arose five years later in New York. In Kass v.
Kass,26 the couple had signed a disposition agreement at the begin-
ning of the infertility treatment stipulating that the "frozen pre-
zygotes [would] not be released from storage for any purpose without
the written consent of both [parties]." 27 The form also donated the
18 Id.
'9 Id. at 590.
20 id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 597.
23 See id. (stating that "an agreement regarding disposition of any untransferred preem-
bryos... should be presumed valid and... enforced as between the progenitors").
24 Id. at 604.
25Id.
26 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
27 Id. at 176.
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preembryos for research studies if the couple "no longer wish[ed] to
initiate a pregnancy or [were] unable to make a decision regarding the
disposition of [the] stored" preembryos. 28 During divorce proceed-
ings, the wife requested that the court disregard the agreement and
award her sole custody of the preembryos.29 The husband, opposing
the removal of the preembryos from storage and any further attempts
at pregnancy, asked for specific performance of the prior disposition
agreement.
30
The trial court awarded the preembryos to the wife. The court
reasoned that "a female participant in the IVF procedure has exclu-
sive decisional authority over the fertilized eggs created through that
process, just as a pregnant woman has exclusive decisional authority
over a nonviable fetus .. .,,31 The appellate division reversed, hold-
ing that a woman does not have the same exclusive authority over
fertilized eggs that she has over a nonviable fetus and that prior dis-
position agreements should determine the outcome of preembryo dis-
putes.
32
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division's
decision that the dispute be resolved based on the prior consent
agreement, stating that "[a]greements between . . . gamete donors
should generally be presumed valid and binding, and enforced in any
dispute between them., 33  Although the appellate division unani-
mously agreed that a prior disposition agreement should control the
disposition of surplus preembryos, that court split on whether the
prior disposition agreement in this case unambiguously conveyed the
parties' intentions.34 The court of appeals addressed this issue by ana-
lyzing the agreement using established contract principles and ulti-
mately found that "the informed consents signed by the parties un-
equivocally manifest[ed] their mutual intention that . . .the pre-
zygotes be donated for research to the IVF program.,
35
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in A.Z. v. B.Z, 36 was
the first court to depart from the widely held view that the creation
and enforcement of prior disposition agreements was the best solution
to the frozen embryo dilemma.37 A.Z. is also distinguishable from
SrId.
29 See id. at 177.
" See id.
31 Id.
32 id.
31 Id. at 180.
34 Id. at 177.31 Id. at 181.
36 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
31 But cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1997) (requiring a couple and the treating
physician to make a written agreement providing for the disposition of embryos in the event of
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Kass and Davis because the wife successfully gave birth to twin
daughters conceived through IVF.38 The wife had already attempted
another implantation without her husband's knowledge when the hus-
band initiated divorce proceedings. 39  The husband filed a motion for
a permanent injunction prohibiting his wife from using any more
preembryos without his consentfn° The probate court ruled in favor
of the husband on equitable grounds, declining to enforce consent
agreements 41 giving the wife sole control in the event of a divorce.42
The wife appealed the probate court decision and the case was
transferred to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,43 which first
determined that the consent forms were unenforceable for not repre-
senting the "true intention of the husband" because the wife had al-
tered the consent forms after he signed them.44 The court further de-
termined that the consent forms were unenforceable because they
provided for the disposition of the preembryos in the event of separa-
tion rather than divorce, two distinct legal events in Massachusetts.
45
The court finally held that any agreement, even an unambiguous one,
compelling one party to involuntarily become a parent was against
public policy and unenforceable. 46
A New Jersey appellate court looked to Massachusetts for guid-
ance when faced with a similar issue shortly after A.Z. v. B.Z. was
decided. In J.B. v. M.B.,47 the wife's desire to have the preembryos
death, divorce, or an unforeseen circumstance); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1980)
(stating that "advance directives ... both minimize misunderstandings and maximize procrea-
tive liberty ... "); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) ("An agreement regard-
ing disposition of any untransferred preembryos in the event of ... divorce.., should be pre-
sumed valid and ... enforced ... ").
38 See A.Z, 725 N.E.2d at 1053.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1053-54. The fertility clinic required a consent form to be signed with each egg
retrieval cycle. The couple had signed a total of seven consent forms, each one granting the
embryos to the wife should the couple become "separated." The majority of consent forms
signed by the husband were blank. The wife altered the consent forms, adding the provision
giving her control in the event of a divorce after her husband had already signed. Id.
2 See id. at 1055 (concluding that "no agreement should be enforced in equity when
intervening events have changed the circumstances such that the [original] agreement... did
not contemplate the actual basis now facing the parties"). The court found that the divorce and
birth of the twins were the events that had changed circumstances so significantly that enforcing
the prior disposition agreement would be inequitable. Id. at 1054-55.
41 Id. at 1051.
44 Id. at 1057.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1059. The court found that the unenforceability of certain adoption and marriage
contracts demonstrated a legislative intent not to use the law to compel individuals into "inti-
mate family relationships." Id. The court put this prior consent agreement in the same category
with the unenforceable marriage and adoption contracts because, if enforced, it would compel
parenthood, an "intimate family relationship." Id.
47 751 A.2d 613 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000), affd as modified, 783 A.2d 707 (NJ.
2001).
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destroyed conflicted with the husband's desire to preserve the reem-
bryos for donation or for his own use in a future relationship. "4 This
couple had signed an agreement relinquishing control of the preem-
bryos to the IVF center in the event of a divorce unless the court
specified otherwise.49 The New Jersey court followed Massachusetts'
lead, disregarding the prior consent agreement and deciding the case
by weighing the wife's right to avoid procreation against the hus-
band's right to procreate. 50 The court gave more weight to the wife's
right not to procreate than to the husband's right to procreate.51 Be-
cause the husband was still fertile, he could fulfill his right to procre-
ate without using the frozen preembryos.52 In addition to looking to
Massachusetts for guidance, the court also looked to the Baby M
53
surrogacy case as support for its holding that binding contracts that
create familial relationships are against public policy and should not
be enforced.54
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the appel-
late court decision giving the wife the right to prevent implantation of
the preembryos. The higher court, however, took a more favorable
view toward prior disposition agreements than the lower court. The
court found that "agreements entered into at the time in vitro fertiliza-
tion is begun... [should be enforced] subject to the right of either
party to change his or her mind about disposition up to the point of
use or destruction of any stored preembryos." 55 In the event that one
of the parties reconsiders the position outlined in the agreement, the
court advocated the Davis balancing test, evaluating the interests of
both parties with "the party choosing not to become a biological par-
ent... ordinarily [to] prevail. 56
To date, the Washington state court is the only court to address
the right of a spouse with no genetic ties to a preembryo to have it
implanted. In Litowitz v. Litowitz,57 lVF created preembryos from
eggs donated by another donor and sperm donated by the husband.
During divorce proceedings, the wife asked the court to grant her
48 Id. at 615.
49 Id. at 616.
50 Id. at 619.51 id.
52 Id.
53 See generally In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988) (refusing to enforce a surrogate
contract terminating the birth mother's parental rights and characterizing commercial surrogacy
as bab selling).
See J.B., 751 A.2d at 619 (holding "that a contract to procreate is contrary to New
Jersey public policy and is unenforceable").
55 Id. at719.
56 Id.
5 10 P.3d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
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"custody" of the preembryos so that she could have them implanted. 8
The husband wanted to donate the preembryos to another couple. 9
The trial court awarded the preembryos to the husband. 6° The trial
court accompanied the award of the preembryos to the husband with
"orders to use his absolute best effort for adoption to a two-person
family. '"
61
The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of the
preembryos to the husband, but found that the trial court had improp-
erly used the best interest of the child analysis.62 The appeals court
instead reached its decision by using the Davis balancing test, weigh-
ing the husband's right not to procreate against the wife's right to
procreate. 63 The court found that the wife had no right to procreate
using the preembryos because she had not contributed any genetic
material.64 The court declined to recognize any procreative rights for
the egg donor with respect to the preembryos, finding that her interest
in the eggs expired when they were fertilized. 65
II. DIscussIoN
A. Enforcement of Prior Disposition Agreements
The developing trend of disfavoring prior disposition agreements,
started by the A.Z. court in Massachusetts and then followed by a
New Jersey court in J.B., represents a significant advance from the
position taken by the Kass and Davis courts. The accepted moral
view of the preembryo as an entity to "be treated with special respect
... [as] a genetically unique, living human entity that might become a
person"66 is more appropriately governed by an analysis closely re-
lated to family law, rather than contract law. Family decisions such as
the decision to marry or relinquish a child are "deeply personal deci-
51 Id. at 1088.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1086-87.
61 Id. at 1087 (stating that the court's decision had "very little to do with property, very
little to do with constitutional rights, [and] everything to do with the benefit of the child"). The
order for the husband to place the preembryos up for adoption combined with the court's state-
ment about the "benefit of the child" indicate that the trial court classified the preembryos as
children in making its decision.
62 Id. at 1088.
63 Id. at 1092.
64 id.
65 Id. at 1093.
66 Ethics Committee, American Fertility Society, The Moral and Legal Status of the
Preembryo, 46 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 29S, 30S (Supp. 1 1986). This "special respect" view
is the most widely held view of preembryos and was first adopted by the Davis court. Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). See also Kass v. Kass, 235 N.E.2d, 174, 182 (N.Y.
1998) (characterizing frozen embryos as "special property... accord[ing] special respect").
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sions that are central to most people's identity and sense of self."67
The law respects the importance of these decisions by treating them
as inalienable rights "that cannot be relinquished irrevocably until a
disposition decision actually is carried out."
''
Binding a couple to a prior disposition agreement has its roots in
contract law. The primary advantage of treating the disposition of
preembryos as a contract dispute is that it binds individuals to previ-
ous obligations, even if their priorities or values change.69 This ad-
vantage, while maximizing the efficiency of commercial transactions,
is ill-suited to govern the disposition of human tissue with the poten-
tial to develop into a child. The potential of the embryo requires that
couples be allowed to make contemporaneous decisions about the fate
of the embryo that reflect their current values.70
Proponents of using prior disposition agreements to govern
preembryo disputes argue that they maximize the procreative liberty
of the couple by allowing them, rather than the court, to retain control
over the disposition of the preembryos. 71 This argument is flawed
because it characterizes the right to privacy and procreative liberty as
the right of the couple rather than the right of two separate individu-
als. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that there was a zone
of privacy in the marital home in Griswold v. Connecticut,72 subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions extended the right of privacy to indi-
viduals.73 The correct frame of reference in determining which solu-
67 Coleman, supra note 8, at 95.
68 Id. at 57-58.
69 See Suchitra Jittaun Satpathi, Gliding Over Treacherous Ice: Fulfillment and Responsi-
bility in the New Reproductive Era; Why Contractual Ordering Is Appropriate, 18 TEMP.
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 55, 72 (1999) (arguing that prior disposition agreements should be en-
forced "precisely because individuals change their minds about performing obligations they
have assumed and bargained for").
70 See id. at 72. See also George J. Annas, Ulysses and the Fate of Frozen Embryos-
Reproduction, Research or Destruction?, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 373, 375-76 (2000) (arguing
that couples should determine the disposition of embryos only after they decide they no longer
want the embryos).
7, See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (stating that "advance directives ... maximize procreative
liberty by reserving to the progenitors the authority to make ... [a] private decision .... ");
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 (stating that enforcing prior disposition agreements will allow gamete
donors to retain decision-making authority over the disposition of the preembryos). See also
John A. Robertson, PriorAgreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHto ST. LJ. 407,
415 (1990) (stating that prior disposition agreements are ideal because they maximize "the
gamete providers' procreative liberty by giving them control over future disposition of embryos
produced... [by] IVF treatment... [rather than allowing] decisions ... [to] be made by others
in ways which might insufficiently value the reproductive concerns of the persons involved");
Satpathi, supra note 69, at 72 (advocating prior disposition agreements as maximizing privacy
and autonomy).
72 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1964) (stating that the idea of the police searching the marital bed-
room was "repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship?').
73 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
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tion maximizes privacy is that of two separate individuals rather than
a single couple.
74
In Griswold, the Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut law
making it a crime for a married couple to use, or for a physician to
distribute, contraception. In reaching its decision, the Court found that
marriage was "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." 75 The Court ulti-
mately found the law unconstitutional because there was no way to
enforce the law without invading the marital zone of privacy.76 The
Griswold decision included a married couple's right to make procrea-
tive decisions within the right to privacy. Classification of this right
as a "fundamental constitutional guarantee 77 mandated that a married
couple be free from any government action that might "sweep unnec-
essarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.,
78
The Kass court echoed the principle that a married couple should
be free from government intrusion in making procreative decisions,
observing that "[t]o the extent possible, it should be the progenitors-
not the State and not the courts-who... make this deeply personal
life choice., 79 Griswold, however, addressed only the right to privacy
of the married couple as a unit. Most preembryo disputes occur dur-
ing divorce, when the marital unit is being dissolved. As demon-
strated by the conflicting interests in the preembryo disputes, a di-
vorcing couple no longer makes procreative decisions as a unit, but
rather each spouse has his or her own distinct interests.
The Supreme Court addressed an unmarried individual's right to
privacy in Eisenstadt v. Baird.80 The Court struck down a Massachu-
setts statute that prohibited single individuals from obtaining contra-
ceptives to prevent a pregnancy. 81 The statute did allow single indi-
viduals to obtain contraceptives for disease prevention and married
couples to obtain contraceptives for any purpose.82  The court found
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.") (emphasis in original).
74 See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW RE-
PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 22 (1994) (stating that, although procreative liberty is "often ex-
pressed or realized in the context of a couple, it is first and foremost an individual interest").
75 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
76 Id. at 485-86 (asking if the state "would ... allow the police to search the sacred pre-
cincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives" and finding "[tihe very
idea... repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marital relationship").
77 Id. at 485.
78 Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
79 Kass, 696 N.E. 2d at 180 (holding to enforce a disposition agreement donating embryos
to research against the former wife's wishes to retain them).
88 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
8, Id. at 441.
82 Id. at 442.
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that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because there was no "ground of difference that ration-
ally explain[ed] the different treatment accorded married and unmar-
ried persons." 83 The Court also clarified that the right to privacy was
the right of "two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup," rather than the right of a marital "entity with a
mind and heart of its own."84 Under this definition of the right to pri-
vacy, a prior disposition agreement does not actually maximize pro-
creative liberty because it reflects a decision made by the couple func-
tioning as a unit rather than the wishes of two separate individuals
with distinctive rights and desires.
The Supreme Court reiterated the concept of an individual right to
privacy five years after Eisenstadt in Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth.85 The statute at issue was a Missouri statute
requiring a woman to obtain the written consent of her spouse to re-
ceive a first trimester abortion.86 The Court rejected the appellee's
argument that "any major change in family status is a decision to be
made jointly by the marriage partners. 87 The Court instead found the
statute unconstitutional because it allowed the husband to infringe on
his wife's right to privacy.88 The Court acknowledged that its deci-
sion effectively gave the wife veto power over her husband, but justi-
fied the disparity of power based on the "direct" and "immediate"
effect of pregnancy on a woman's body.89
A man wishing to avoid implantation of preembryos is not faced
with the same "direct" and "immediate!' effect as a woman seeking to
terminate a pregnancy. His right to avoid parenthood, however, is in
conflict with his wife's desire to become a parent, just as a pregnant
woman's right to privacy may be in conflict with her husband's desire
for her to continue the pregnancy. However, the Danforth decision
further illustrates the idea that a married couple is not compelled to
make procreative decisions as a single unit. The Court weighed each
individual's rights and burdens separately and then reached a decision
83 Id. at 447.
4 Id.at453.
s' 428 U.S. 52 (1976).86 Id. at 67-68.
87 Id. at 68. The appellee's argument in Danforth was the same argument made by the
Kass and Davis courts in support of prior disposition agreements. See Kass v. Kass, 696
N.E.2d. 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) ("Advance directives, subject to mutual change of mind that must
be jointly expressed, both minimize misunderstandings and maximize procreative liberty... );
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) ("[T]he progenitors, having provided the
gametic material giving rise to the preembryos, [should] retain decision-making authority as to
their disposition."). These arguments focus on the progenitors' joint decision-making authority,
but do not consider the rights of the gamete donors as individuals.
8' Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69.
89 Id. at71.
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based on the wife's individual right to privacy. 90 A court faced with
a preembryo dispute should not enforce a prior disposition agreement
in an attempt to maximize a couple's right to privacy because the
couple as a unit no longer has a right to privacy. In deciding a preem-
bryo dispute, a court should follow the guidelines set by Danforth and
settle the dispute by considering each individual's rights and burdens
separately. Automatically enforcing a prior disposition agreement
does not give the court the opportunity to weigh each spouse's rights
and burdens individually.
A prior disposition agreement maximizes privacy and autonomy
only as long as the couple agrees on the options outlined in the agree-
ment. Once the couple disagrees, then their individual rights and
desires are in conflict with one another. In finding a solution, the
court should weigh the burdens and benefits to each party and devise
a solution that minimizes the burdens for each person.91 Such a solu-
tion may include enforcing the original agreement, but this enforce-
ment should not be automatic if it might infringe on the procreative
rights of the opposing party by compelling involuntary parenthood.
To mandate procreation is more of an invasion of privacy than a court
invalidating a prior disposition agreement.
In Roe v. Wade,92 the Supreme Court characterized compelled
parenthood as an invasion of the right to privacy articulated in Eisen-
stadt and Griswold.93 The Texas law at issue made it a crime for a
woman to receive an abortion unless the purpose of the abortion was
to save her life.94 The Court decided that the state's interest in regu-
lating abortion did not begin until the second trimester, with the
"abortion decision and its effectuation ... left to the medical judg-
ment of the pregnant woman's attending physician" during the first
trimester.95 In reaching its decision the Court considered the psycho-
logical and emotional detriment imposed on a woman by compelled
parenthood.9
6
90 See id. at 69-70 (recognizing a husband's interest in a wife's pregnancy, but ultimately
finding that he could not have the unilateral authority to prevent his wife's pregnancy where the
state lacked that authority).
91 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603 ("Resolving disputes over conflicting interests of consti-
tutional import is a task familiar to the courts. One way of resolving these disputes is to con-
sider the positions of the parties, the significance of their interests, and the relative burdens that
will be imposed by differing resolutions.").
92 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9' See id. at 153.
94 ld. at 113.
9' Id. at 164.
96 Id. at 152 ("Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful
life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be
taxed by childcare. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
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Roe specifically considered pregnant women, but the detriment
described by the Court could apply to any person who is unwillingly
compelled to become a parent, including a man or a woman whose
genetic child is borne by a surrogate. The Court spoke of psychologi-
cal harm, distress caused by an unwanted child, and the mental and
physical toll of child care.97 Those detriments are not specific to
pregnancy and do not actually take effect until after the child is born.
Any unwilling parent, whether pregnant or not, could feel distress at
the thought of an unwanted child, or be emotionally and physically
taxed by caring for a child.
This analogy between unwanted pregnancy and forced implanta-
tion is imperfect because pregnancy uniquely affects a woman's bod-
ily integrity. A man or a woman whose genetic child is carried by a
surrogate does not initially invest the same physical resources in par-
enthood as a pregnant woman. The Roe opinion, however, focused
on the emotional and psychological ramifications of unwanted par-
enthood, ramifications not necessarily specific to pregnancy. 98 En-
forcing a prior disposition agreement compelling a person to become
a parent would violate privacy in the same way that the Texas statute
in Roe did. Both actions invade the right of privacy by forcing an
individual to become an unwilling parent and experience "psycho-
logical harm," mental and physical taxation by child care, and a "dis-
tressful life and future."
99
The Supreme Court affirmed Roe's central holding, which recog-
nized a woman's right to an abortion before fetal viability without
undue interference from the State, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.1
°°
The Court characterized the choice to avoid procreation as "the most
intimate and personal [of] choices . . .central to personal dignity
and autonomy. . .[and] to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable.., to care for
it.").
97 id.
98 Id. See also ROBERTSON, supra note 74, at 24 (1994) (acknowledging that reproduction
"affects women's bodies in a direct and substantial way," but also that the "deprivation of the
ability to avoid reproduction" can "affect men in significant ways as well" because it "centrally
affects one's psychological and social and moral responsibilities").
99 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
o50 U.S. 833 (1992). Although the Court upheld the central holding in Roe, it rejected
the trimester framework, which restricted the state from regulating first-trimester abortions for
any reason other than protection of a pregnant woman's health. ld. at 878. The Court lowered
the standard of review for abortion regulations by allowing the state to "take measures to ensure
that the woman's choice is informed" in order "[t]o promote the State's profound interest in
potential life." Id. Using the lowered standard of review to analyze the Pennsylvania statute at
issue, the Court characterized the informed consent, 24-hour waiting period, parental consent,
and reporting provisions as constitutional and the spousal notice provision as unconstitutional.
Il
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Amendment." 10 1 This liberty encompasses more than a pregnant
woman's right to have an abortion. The Court was not only concerned
with the physical burdens unique to pregnancy, but also with the
autonomy to "define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life."'1 2 Self-definition of
personhood and the "meaning of the universe" implicate intellectual
and emotional freedom as well physical freedom.10 3 Preembryo im-
plantation against the wishes of a gamete donor would restrict intel-
lectual and emotional freedom by compelling those gamete donors to
define a "concept of existence" including genetic parenthood without
giving them the opportunity to create a definition of "personhood"
which does not include any type of parenthood.'04 This limiting of
intellectual and emotional freedom infringes on the procreative liberty
"central to personal dignity and autonomy" protected first in Roe and
then reaffirmed in Casey.105
Finally, advance disposition agreements will not minimize costs
or disputes if one party no longer wishes to abide by the agreement.
There were prior agreements in Kass and A.Z., but those agreements
did not prevent disputes at the trial and appellate level. Prior disposi-
tion agreements will minimize disputes only when both parties agree
to be bound by the contract, in which case the agreement is not even
necessary. Reluctance to litigate might prevent some couples from
contesting a signed disposition agreement even if one spouse has de-
parted from his or her original position. Although the disposition
agreement would have averted a dispute in this case, it would also
have minimized procreative liberty by committing the dissenting
spouse to a disposition that does not reflect that spouse's current
wishes or life situation.
The maximization-of-autonomy argument also assumes that the
couple's true wishes are expressed in the prior consent agreement.
This may not be true if a disposition agreement must be made as a
condition of undergoing the fertility treatment. A couple may be un-
sure of their desires for surplus preembryos, but feel pressured to
commit to some decision to get the treatment they so desperately de-
sire. 106 This pressure is eliminated if the couple is not forced to make
a decision about the disposition of the embryos until it is actually time
10 Id. at 851.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See Coleman, supra note 8, at 104 (criticizing mandatory disposition agreements as
"put[ting] pressure on patients to commit to something, even if they are unsure of what their
preferences in the future are likely to be") (emphasis in original).
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to do so. The contemporaneous decision will better reflect the current
values and wishes than a prior disposition agreement.
107
The policy goal of ensuring that current values govern family re-
lationships is evident in the court's refusal to enforce contracts never
to divorce, many, or terminate parental rights before birth.108 This
philosophy is reflected in Straub v. B.MT.,109 where the Indiana Su-
preme Court refused to enforce a preconception agreement relieving a
father of all financial duty to any children conceived with the child's
mother. The court found that society's interest in securing the support
and education for children outweighed the individual's autonomy to
contract." 0 This case falls right into line with the well-established
principle that contracts should not be enforced in light of significantly
changed conditions, in this case the birth of an actual child.'
A divorce or the birth of a child may be a significant enough
change to invalidate a prior disposition agreement. As a result of dif-
ficult childhood experiences, the husband in Davis had a "vehement"
objection to parenthood outside of marriage. 112  For him, there was
such a substantial difference between marriage and divorce that he
was unwilling to father a child with a woman to whom he was not
married. To enforce a prior disposition agreement signed during the
marriage after a divorce would be to disregard the significance of di-
vorce to the Davis husband and those who share his feelings. Such a
disregard would violate the equitable principle of not enforcing con-
tracts when intervening events have significantly changed circum-
stances surrounding initial contract formation." 3
Each couple in A.Z., J.B., and Litowitz had conceived a child at
the time of divorce." 4 Parenthood requires a substantial commitment
to provide "nurturing ... and financial support to offspring."" 5 A
person might have to actually experience the birth of one child to de-
termine that he or she is not able to commit the financial and emo-
107 See Ud at 96 (stating that "[m]aking the right to control these decisions inalienable
ensures that, as a person's identity changes over time, she will not be forced to live with the
consequences of prior decisions that are no longer consistent with the values and preferences of
the person she has become").
'os See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 2000).
109 645 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. 1994).
11o Id. at 852.
111 See Donna M. Sheinbach, Examining Disputes Over Ownership Rights to Frozen Em-
bryos: Will Prior Consent Documents Survive If Challenged By State Law and/or Constitutional
Principles?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 989, 1018 (1999) (referencing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS 261,265 (1981)).112 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
113 See A.Z, 725 N.E.2d at 1055.
114 Id. at 1053; J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613, 615 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000), affid as
modified 783 A.2d 707 (NJ. 2001); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086, 1088 (Wash. Ct. App.
2000).
115 ROBERTSON, supra note 74, at27.
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tional resources necessary for an additional child. A childless indi-
vidual may sign a prior disposition agreement mandating the implan-
tation of surplus preembryos without fully understanding the re-
sources necessary to rear multiple children. If a gamete donor
changes his or her position after the birth of one child, a court should
respect the effect of parenthood on the gamete donor and refuse to
enforce any agreement that could make him or her an unwilling par-
ent.
116
Not only would enforcement of a contract mandating implanta-
tion and reproduction violate public policy, but the enforcement of a
contract mandating the destruction of the preembryos or their use in
research would violate public policy as well. 117  In Kass, the New
York Court of Appeals upheld a previous agreement allowing any
leftover embryos to be used for research. 1 8 The Kass mandate that
tissue be donated to research because of consent given at a much ear-
lier time and under different circumstances goes against the guide-
lines for embryo research established by the National Institutes of
Health ("NIH").119 NIH guidelines for embryo research propose that
"there ... be a clear separation between the decision to create em-
bryos for infertility treatment and the decision to donate early human
embryos.., for research purposes."1 20 The guidelines further suggest
that couples should be approached about donation only at the time of
deciding the disposition of the excess embryos. 21  These require-
ments would preclude the use of prior disposition agreements signed
at the inception of IVF. Such agreements not only mingle the infertil-
ity treatment and research decisions, but also ask a couple to make a
decision about the excess embryos long before the actual disposition.
Approaching the couple only at the time when the excess embryos are
116 The law's respect for the profound effect of parenthood is also reflected by laws that
give genetic mothers a waiting period after the birth of the baby to revoke consent to the adop-
tion. SeeA.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1058.
117 See generally Annas, supra note 70, at 375-76 (discussing guidelines adopted by the
biomedical research community for embryo research and applying those guidelines to Kass).
118 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d. 174, 181 (N.Y. 1998).
119 See Annas, supra note 70, at 375 (stating that "NIH guidelines.., prohibit enforcing
advance contracts").
120 Id. (quoting NATIONAL INSTrrUTES OF HEALTH, DRAFT NATIONAL INSTITrTES OF
HEALTH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PLURIPOTENT STEM CELLS, at
http://www.nih.gov/newslstemcell/draftguidelines.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2000)). NIH has
withdrawn the guidelines for research involving human stem cells derived from human embryos
in deference to the guidelines established by President George W. Bush. The President's guide-
lines allow federal funds to "be used [only] on stem cell lines that were derived with the in-
formed consent of the donors." Fact Sheet, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Embryonic Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9, 2001), available at
http:llwww.whitehouse.gov/newslreleases/200108/print/200lO809-1.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2002). Although less detailed, the current guidelines mandate that both donors consent to re-
search in the same way as did the prior NIH guidelines. See id.
121 Id.
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to be donated continues the theme of allowing individuals the right to
make contemporaneous decisions about family matters.122 The judi-
ciary should defer to the NIH guidelines because that institution has
more experience and knowledge about research studies involving
human tissue.
The inalienable rights approach to preembryo conflicts would al-
low couples to determine the fate of their stored preembryos immedi-
ately before the proposed action was taken rather than being bound by
a prior disposition agreement. This approach is superior to the con-
tract approach because it (1) gives the embryos the "special respect"
mandated by their moral status, (2) maximizes individual procreative
liberty, (3) allows the expression of the individual's current values,
and (4) falls in line with the informed consent guidelines widely ac-
cepted by the medical community.
B. Balancing Test
In the absence of a prior disposition agreement, either because the
parties failed to create one (as in Davis"23 and Litowitz24) or because
the court refused to enforce the agreement (as in A.Z.'2 and J.B."2),
courts have balanced the right to procreate of one spouse against the
right of the opposing spouse to avoid procreation. Each court found
that the opposing spouse's right to avoid procreation outweighed the
right to procreate of the spouse desiring implantation. 27 This balanc-
ing test is based on the premise, first articulated in Davis, that the
'22 Id. at 375.
123 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992) ("One way of resolving these dis-
putes is to consider the positions of the parties, the significance of their interests, and the rela-
tive burdens that will be imposed by differing resolutions. In this case, the issue centers on the
two aspects of procreational autonomy--the right to procreate and the right to avoid procrea-
tion.').
124 Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086, 1089 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (citing the balancing
test used by the Davis court and concluding that the husband has the right not to procreate while
the wife does not have the right to procreate because she did not contribute any genetic material
to the embryos).
'2s A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (Mass. 2000) (quoting the trial judge as "deter-
minin[g] that the 'best solution' was to balance the wife's interest in procreation against the
husband's interest in avoiding procreation").
'26 J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613, 618 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 2000), afld as modified 783
A.2d 707 (NJ. 2001) ("In the present case, the wife's right not to become a parent... conflicts
with the husband's right to procreate .... Recognition and enforcement of the wife's right
would not seriously impair the husband's right to procreate.").
,7 See A.Z, 725 N.E.2d at 1055 ("[T]he husband's interest in avoiding procreation out-
weighed the wife's interest in having additional children...."); J.B., 751 A.2d at 619 (arguing
that "[e]nforcement of the... contract to create a child would impair the wife's constitutional
right not to procreate, whereas permitting destruction of the embryos would not effectively
impair the husband's reproductive rights"); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (finding that "Mary Sue
Davis' interest in donation is not as significant as the interest Junior Davis has in avoiding par-
enthood"); Litowitz, 10 P.3d at 1092 (stating that the husband's right not to procreate compelled
an award of the preembryos to him).
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right to avoid procreation is "ejuivalent" to the right to procreate by
having preembryos implanted.
1
The premise of the balancing test, however, is flawed. The
spouses in these cases do not have equivalent interests. The funda-
mental right to procreate does not include the right to have the
preembryos implanted, while the fundamental right to avoid procrea-
tion does include the right to oppose implantation. The inequality of
the spouses' interests makes it nearly impossible for the spouse desir-
ing implantation to prevail. Evidence of this inequality is apparent in
the failure of any United States court to ultimately award the preem-
bryos to the spouse who wants them implanted. The right to procrea-
tion as defined by the Supreme Court is a negative right, meaning that
the state is not compelled to take any positive action to ensure fertility
for infertile individuals. 129
The Supreme Court's protection of reproductive autonomy in
Skinner v Oklahoma'30 emanated from the protection of parental
rights in Meyer v. Nebraska131 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.132 The
statute at issue in Meyer was a Nebraska law that prohibited
"teach[ing] any subject to any person in any language than [sic] the
English language." 133 The Court included "the right of the individual
to... marry, establish a home and bring up children" in the liberties
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.134 The Court found the
Nebraska law unconstitutional because it improperly infringed on
parents' right to "bring up" their children as they saw fit. 135
In Pierce, the Court examined an Oregon law that compelled all
children to attend public school rather than private or religious
schools. 36 The Court invalidated the law because it "unreasonably
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents.., to direct the upbringing and
education of children."1
37
Having established the right to rear children free from unreason-
able state interference in Meyer and Pierce, the Court directly ad-
dressed the right to procreate in Skinner. The Oklahoma statute be-
fore the Court allowed the sterilization of any person convicted twice
'2' Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
129 See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note 74, at 29 (stating that "the right to reproduce is a
negative right against public or private interference, not a positive right to the services or re-
sources needed to reproduce").
"0 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
' 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
132 268 U.S. 510 (1928).
133 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 402.
136 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530.
137 Id. at 534-35.
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or more of felonies involving moral turpitude. 138 Criminals convicted
of felonies not involving "moral turpitude," such as embezzlement,
were not subject to sterilization. 139 The Supreme Court characterized
the legislation as "involv[ing] one of the basic civil rights of man."' 4
The Court went on to state that "[m]arriage and procreation are fun-
damental to the very existence and survival of the race."'14' Having
classified the right to procreate as a fundamental right, the Court sub-
jected the law to strict scrutiny.142 Oklahoma did not have a compel-
ling interest for inequitably applying the law to habitual "chicken
stealers" and sparing habitual embezzlers, when both had repeatedly
committed felonies.' 43
The common issue in Meyer and Skinner was an affirmative act
by the state to interfere with procreation and child rearing. In Meyer
that action was constraining educational choices; in Skinner the action
was sterilization. The right to procreate, as defined by those cases,
includes an individual's right to rear children free from direct state
interference. In contrast, a spouse desiring implantation is not faced
with any direct state action restricting the right to procreate. The
spouse desiring implantation is actually seeking an affirmative action
on the part of the state in the form of a court order awarding him or
her the preembryos to make implantation possible. The right to pro-
create does not include the right to such an affirmative action; there-
fore, the right to have preembryos implanted should not be included
within the fundamental right to procreate.
Roe, Griswold, and Eisenstadt are similar to Skinner and Meyer in
that each of these cases involved a direct act by the state inhibiting
procreative liberty. In Griswold and Eisenstadt, the affirmative action
was an anti-contraception law; in Roe the affirmative action was an
anti-abortion law. The Supreme Court stayed in line with the prece-
dent set by Meyer and Skinner by prohibiting direct state action in-
fringing on the right to avoid procreation. The spouse opposing im-
138 Id. at 535.
'39 Id. at 541.
140 Id.
141 id.
142 Id.
141 Id. (stating that "[s]terilization of those who have thrice committed grand larceny with
immunity for those who are embezzlers is a clear, pointed, unmistakable discrimination"). The
Court, unfortunately, did not always carefully scrutinize laws restricting procreative liberty, as
illustrated by its approval of a similar Virginia statute in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
That statute permitted the involuntary sterilization of "feeble-minded" individuals committed to
state institutions. Id. at 205. The Court classified the statute as constitutional based on the
state's legitimate interest in not perpetuating "feeble-minded" citizens, and the law applied
equally to similarly situated individuals, i.e., all "feeble-minded" citizens committed to state
institutions. Id. at 207. Buck, however, was decided primarily on the basis of unfounded, unsci-
entific eugenic presumptions, rather than constitutional principles.
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plantation in the preembryo disputes is similarly situated to the peti-
tioners in Roe, Griswold, and Eisenstadt. His or her right to avoid
procreation would remain intact as long as the state did not take any
affirmative action to interfere. The right to avoid procreation by re-
fusing implantation is included in the fundamental right to privacy.
The Court explicitly classified the right to procreate as a negative
right in Harris v. McRae.144 There, the Court considered whether the
Hyde Amendment violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment by prohibiting federal funds from paying for any abor-
tion not obtained in cases of rape or incest, or to save the life of the
mother.145 The Court rejected the argument that the restriction of fed-
eral funds for abortion "impinge[d] on the 'liberty' protected by the
Due Process Clause as recognized in Roe v. Wade."' 46  Roe protected
a woman from "unduly burdensome interference" with her fundamen-
tal right to avoid procreation, 147 but it did not create "an affirmative
constitutional obligation" for the state to remove all obstacles "neces-
sary to realize.., that freedom." 148 The Court explained that "al-
though the government may not place obstacles in the path of..
a[n] exercise of. . .[procreative liberty], it need not remove those
not of its own creation."'149
In Harris, the Court classified indigency as an obstacle to the ex-
ercise of procreative freedom, but it did not view the obstacle as hav-
ing been created by the government. Although a woman may have
the fundamental right to obtain an abortion, she will be prevented
from doing so if she does not have enough money to pay for the abor-
tion.150 Because indigency is "not [the product] of governmental re-
strictions," the state has no obligation to remove that obstacle by
funding an abortion.' 5' An infertile person seeking genetic parent-
hood is in the same situation as an indigent woman seeking an abor-
tion. In this case infertility, rather than indigency, is the obstacle to
'44 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189 (1989) (classifying the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment as negative rights, meaning that the state is not obligated to take any affirmative
action to help an individual realize those rights). The Court found that the Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Social Service's failure to remove a child from his abusive father was not a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court found that "the Due Process Clauses generally confer no
affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life,
liberty, or property ... ." Id. at 196. The reasoning in DeShaney and McRae suggests that an
infertile person has no right to receive "governmental aid" to facilitate procreation.
141 Harris, 448 U.S. at 302.
146 Id. at 312.
147 Id. at 314.
148 Id. at 318.
149 Id. at 316.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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the exercise of a fundamental procreative right. Like indigency,
infertility is not the product of a government restriction. Therefore,
just as the state had no obligation to remove the indigency barrier to
abortion, it has no obligation to remove the infertility barrier to
genetic parenthood. The spouse seeking implantation is in fact asking
the court to remove a barrier to genetic parenthood that was not
created by any state action when he or she seeks a court order to
obtain custody of the preembryos. Because the state has no
affirmative obligation to help an infertile person "realize all the
advantages" of the right to procreate, an individual's right to
procreate is not infringed upon when the court declines to award
"custody" of the preembryos for implantation.
Under a balancing analysis, the interests of the spouse opposing
implantation will always outweigh the interests of the spouse desiring
implantation, even if the preembryos are the desiring spouse's last
chance at genetic parenthood. The right to refuse implantation is
properly included within the fundamental right to avoid procreation
while the right to have the preembryos implanted is not included
within the fundamental right to procreate. One commentator has sug-
gested that even if the right to procreate is not a legal right, it should
be respected as a moral right because of the "centrality of reproduc-
tion to personal identity, meaning, and dignity."' 5 2 A moral right, not
protected by the Constitution, will never outweigh a constitutionally
protected fundamental right. The state has no obligation to facilitate
reproduction for infertile individuals by awarding them custody of
preembryos to allow implantation. The state does have the obligation
not to infringe on the right to avoid procreation, which would remain
intact as long as the state takes no affirmative action. The spouse op-
posing implantation does not need a court order awarding him or her
"custody" of the preembryos to express his or her right to avoid pro-
creation. Both spouses will stay secure in the right to avoid procrea-
tion as long as the preembryos remain frozen in storage, where they
already were before any court proceedings were initiated.
The best solution to this dilemma is for the court to abandon "the
pretense of 'balancing' other interests"'153 and identify "the constitu-
tional liberty from coerced parenthood.., as the sole basis for decid-
ing these cases," 'm as the Massachusetts and New Jersey courts ulti-
mately did. Using freedom from forced parenthood as the sole basis
for deciding preembryo cases adequately protects the right to avoid
152 ROBERTSON, supra note 74, at 30.
... Daniel I. Steinberg, Divergent Conceptions: Procreational Rights and Disputes Over the
Fate of Frozen Embryos, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 315,316 (1998).
154 id.
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procreation by (1) preventing the enforcement of any disposition
agreement allowing implantation against the wishes of a gamete do-
nor, and (2) preventing an infertile individual's right to procreate
from ever outweighing the right to avoid procreation in a balancing
test analysis.
Im. PROPOSED SOLUTION
When faced with a preembryo dispute, courts should first ask
gamete donors to reach a joint decision about the disposition of the
stored preembryos. If the couple cannot reach an agreement, the
preembryos should remain in storage until they are no longer viable
or until the couple is able to reach a joint decision. Requiring the
couple to make a joint contemporaneous decision incorporates the
inalienable rights approach used in other areas of family law. Such an
approach respects the potential of the preembryos to become children
and make the gamete donors parents. This solution also protects the
fundamental right to avoid procreation by not allowing the preem-
bryos to be implanted against the wishes of a gamete donor in any
circumstances.
This solution alone is inadequate, however, because it disregards
the "centrality" of genetic reproduction to the "personal identity,
meaning, and dignity" of an individual who sincerely desires to ex-
perience genetic parenthood.155  The person desiring implantation
does not have a judicial remedy because the right to assistance in pro-
creation is a moral, rather than a legal, right.156  The legislature and
the medical community are therefore better suited than the judiciary
to protect the interests of the spouse who desires implantation.
157
Congress should direct the states to require all couples with preem-
bryos stored in certified clinics to receive uniform counseling before
undergoing IVF and preembryo storage. The counseling information
should (1) inform patients that they will be required to reach a joint
contemporaneous decision about the disposition of their stored
155 ROBERTSON, supra note 74, at 30.
156 See id. The lack of a judicial remedy is also evident in the refusal of five courts faced
with five unique circumstances to award "custody" of the preembryos to the spouse desiring
implantation.
157 See, e.g., ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, PROCEED
WITH CARE: FINAL REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOL-
OGY 598 (1993) (explaining that "from the Commission's ethical perspective, these rules are a
matter for society, through its legislators, to decide-not for the courts to decide through an
adversarial process"). If the right to procreate is indeed "widely accepted as a basic, human
right," then the law should reflect that widely held belief. ROBERTSON, supra note 74, at 29.
The judiciary does not have the constitutional basis to facilitate a person in expressing this right
once it is already in conflict with another's right to avoid procreation. The task then falls to the
legislature to reflect society's "widely held belief' and take preventative measures to protect an
individual's interest in genetic procreation before a conflict ever occurs.
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preembryos, and (2) educate them about treatment options that only
implicate the procreative rights of one gamete donor. The goal of this
counseling would be to prevent disputes and protect the rights of
those who feel strongly about genetic parenthood.
Because of the scarcity of United States law specifically regulat-
ing assisted reproductive technology, Congress should look to the
detailed regulations of Europe and Canada for guidance in creating a
uniform model of informed consent for infertility patients.
Fertility clinics in the United States are essentially free from uni-
form government regulation.1 58 State and federal laws directly regu-
lating assisted reproductive technology are scarce.159 The sole federal
regulation, the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act,160
requires all assisted reproductive technology programs to "annually
report to the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] through the
Centers for Disease Control (1) pregnancy success rates ... and (2)
the identity of each embryo laboratory... used by... [the] program
and whether the laboratory is certified... or has applied for such cer-
tification." 161  The Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") then pub-
lishes the success rates, the identity of all embryo laboratories, and
whether those laboratories have met the certification requirements.
162
The Fertility Act also requires the CDC to "develop a model program
for the certification of embryo laboratories" outlining uniform scien-
tific protocols and record keeping provisions.' 63 The Secretary of
Health and Human Services then presents this model program to the
governor, legislature, and public health officials of each state with
encouragement to adopt and enforce the certification progran. 164 Both
155 See Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger, 34
HOUS. L. REv. 609, 651 (1997) ("At most, physicians are asked to report their practices and
outcomes to state agencies or obtain written authorization from patients before proceeding with
treatment.").
'59 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -a-5 (1994) [hereinafter "The Fertility Acf] (regulating
certification of embryo laboratories); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1997) (focusing on
informed consent to IVF, requiring all couples undergoing an assisted reproductive technology
to sign a written agreement that provides for the disposition of gametes and embryos in the
event of divorce, death, or other unforeseen circumstances); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123,
9:126 (West 1991) (defining an in vitro fertilized human ovum as a "judicial person" that can
only be disposed of through implantation); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:I (1998) (also focus-
ing on informed consent, specifying that patients be informed of their legal rights and obliga-
tions along with the psychological and medical risks); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2971.1 (Michie
1998) (providing the strongest emphasis on providing medical information, such as success rates
and protocols).
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-I to -a-5 (1994).
161 42 U.S.C. § 263a-l(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
162 42 U.S.C. § 263a-5 (1994).
163 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2(a)(l) (1994).
'6 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2(b) (1994).
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state adoption of the model program and certification are voluntary,
meaning that an uncertified fertility clinic may still operate.
65
This scarcity of regulation shifts the focus from preventing
preembryo conflicts to resolving them once they have already oc-
curred. Litigation is currently the chief remedy for individuals with
conflicting interests about their stored preembryos. The primary dis-
advantages to this approach are its inability to prevent disputes and
the inadequate protection it provides for those with a strong desire for
genetic parenthood. Legislation clearly outlining a couple's rights
and requiring that they be informed of those rights before treatment
would address both these deficiencies. This advance notice would
allow infertility patients and physicians to design treatment plans with
the goals of minimizing disputes and protecting the moral right of
each gamete donor to become a genetic parent.
Congress could accomplish the goal of advance notice by incor-
porating a uniform counseling requirement into the model certifica-
tion program presented to the states under the Fertility Act. This
counseling information would outline the gamete donors' legal rights
to implant, destroy, or donate any frozen preembryos. Learning that
no United States court has yet compelled implantation against the
wishes of a gamete donor would put individuals on notice to make
alternative arrangements if they have strong feelings about becoming
a genetic parent. For example, a man who feels strongly about becom-
ing a genetic father might decide to have some sperm frozen along
with the preembryos so that he alone has control over his last chance
at fatherhood. While the man's wife would have the power to prevent
the implantation of their shared preembryos, she would have no con-
trol over her husband's preserved sperm. A woman in the same situa-
tion might decide to have some of her eggs fertilized with anonymous
donor sperm so that she could have the resulting preembryos im-
planted even if her husband later departed from his original posi-
tion.166 Informing patients about the legal effect of their medical de-
165 See 42 U.S.C. § 263a-4 (1994) (describing the effect of certification revocation and
suspension).
166 A woman could not store unfertilized ova because the technology for preserving them
is not yet sufficiently developed. See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 7, at 83. The New
York State Task Force also predicted that "ovum preservation, combined with the standard
practice of semen freezing, might... replace embryo cryopreservation." Id. The technology for
preserving unfertilized ova recently has been improving, however, with pregnancies resulting
from stored ova, although at a lower success rate than those derived from stored preembryos.
See G. Coticchio et al., Cryopreservation of Human Oocytes, 4 HUMAN FERTIL. 152 (2001).
Until the technology for ovum preservation is perfected, the next best alternative is for a woman
to retain sole control over a preembryo by having her ova fertilized with anonymous donor
sperm. See, e.g., Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086, 1092 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that
the wife had no right to the preembryos because she did not contribute any gametes, but that the
husband as the sole progenitor has a right to control the disposition of the preembryos and that
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cisions would allow them the opportunity to at least consider alterna-
tive treatment options, even if they ultimately choose not to exercise
any of those options. Inclusion of the legal ramifications of preem-
bryo storage in a mandatory counseling session would also mesh well
with established principles of informed consent to medical treat-
ment.167
Canada, Austria, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Norway, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom all have detailed fertility clinic
licensing regulations with specific provisions for informed consent
and preembryo storage. The regulations adopted by these countries
should serve as guidelines for developing similar storage and consent
requirements in the United States. The United Kingdom has the most
detailed licensing requirements, outlined in the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act of 1990 ("Embryology Act"). 68  The Embryol-
ogy Act created a separate statutory licensing authority, the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority ("HUFEA").' 69 HUFEA has
the responsibility to review fertility clinics for compliance with the
Embryology Act and then issue licenses to the clinics that have ful-
filled those requirements!" This is a mandatory license required for
any clinic to create an in vitro embryo, store the embryo, use gametes,
or implant an embryo.171
The Embryology Act preempts disputes about the disposition of
stored embryos by requiring the written consent of both gamete do-
nors to keep the embryos in storage. 72  Therefore the partner who
opposes implantation could simply withdraw consent to keeping the
embryos in storage. Once removed from storage, the embryo would
no longer be viable or available for implantation. The Embryology
Act has detailed requirements for the scope of the consent to the em-
bryo storage. The consent to storage must (1) specify the maximum
amount of time the embryos may remain in storage, and (2) the fate of
the egg donor's interest terminated with fertilization). Under a Litowitz analysis, a spouse who
has not contributed any genetic material to a preembryo does not have the right to control its
disposition. Individuals could minimize disputes by preserving their own gametes along with
shared preembryos so that they would still have the opportunity to become a genetic parent even
if the other spouse disagrees.
167 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ('True consent ... is the
informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the
options available and the risks attendant upon each."). Such options and knowledge should
include legal information along with medical information because it is the law that will provide
a remedy when a problem arises from the medical treatment.
163 See GILLIAN DOUGLAS, LAW, FERTILITY, AND REPRODUCTION 117 (1991).
169 See id at 116 (referencing §§ 11-22 of the Embryology Act).
170 See id. at 117 (referencing § 2(1) of the Embryology Act).
171 See id
172 See id. at 126 (referencing schedule 3, paragraph 1 of the Embryology Act).
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the embryos in the event of the incapacity of the person who gave the
initial consent for their storage. 
173
The Netherlands has a similar licensing framework. The 1989
IVF Planning Decree defines the framework for licensing IVF cen-
ters. 174 All Dutch fertility centers engaging in IVF and embryo trans-
fer must have a license. 175 The licensing requirements include a
minimum success rate and adherence to medical protocols outlined by
the Planning Decree. The pending Fertilization Techniques Act and
updated Planning Decree will incorporate guidelines for the informed
consent and embryo storage recommended by the Health Council's
IVF Committee. The IVF Committee recommended that "cryopre-
servation ... be allowed as part of IVF treatment under strict condi-
tions, [relating to] informed consent of the people whose embryos are
concerned."' 176 The Committee suggested that the couple's separate
permission for cryopreservation be obtained, and then only after they
had been informed about "the possibility of freezing and storing, its
safety, their joint decision-making power, the (maximum) storage
period, and the options for use of the embryos if these are no longer
required for their own use."'177 The Committee also recommended that
each center be required to provide a counseling brochure with uni-
form information as a condition for a license.1
78
Canada has not yet enacted a law licensing fertility clinics, but
the Assisted Reproductive Technologies Commission recommended
that the legislature create a National Reproductive Technology Com-
mission, analogous to the English HUFEA, to regulate the licensing
and regulation of fertility treatments. 179 This Canadian proposal ech-
oed the Dutch and British advocacy of uniform consent, recommend-
ing that this licensing board create standard consent agreements for
all clinics. 80 It was in line with the British and Dutch approach by
concluding that (1) both gamete donors should have joint authority,
and (2) their disposition desires should be settled before the preem-
bryos are created.
173 See id. at 127 (referencing paragraph 8(2) of the Embryology Act).
174 Trees A.M. te Braake, Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology in the Nether-
lands, 35 TEX. INT'L LJ. 93, 94 (2000) (referencing the IVF Planning Decree's four phases of
licensing).
'75 See id.
176 Braake, supra note 174, at 103 (quoting Letter ZZT/TOPAZ/941055, in HEALTH
COUNCIL OF THE NETHERLANDS: COMMrTrEE ON IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, IN VITRO FERTILI-
zATION (IVF) 57 (Rijswijk, Pub. No. 997/03E, Feb. 10, 1997)) [hereinafter Netherlands Report].
177 Id. at 104 (quoting Netherlands Report, supra note 176, at 61).
178 Id. at 112.
171 ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEw REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 157, at 167.
180 See id. at 598 (suggesting that the National Reproductive Technologies Commission
("NRTC") "develop standardized consent forms listing the decisions required from donors").
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The United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands all mandate
or recommend that fertility patients receive uniform information
when consenting to embryo storage. 181 The rationale behind these
uniform consent requirements is to make it "unnecessary for the
courts to sort out disagreements with respect to [preembryos] ... by
establish[ing] clear rules."'182 The United States Congress should di-
rect states to adopt this goal of clarity for the prevention of disputes as
well. Once a preembryo dispute ends up in court, the spouse desiring
implantation has almost no legal remedy. An overall reduction in the
number of preembryo disputes combined with clear and advance no-
tice of legal rights, would give some protection to the gamete donors
desiring implantation. Clear and advance notice of the consequences
of preembryo storage would allow both gamete donors to protect their
interests in genetic parenthood by using the alternatives discussed
previously.
To achieve this clear and advance notice, the United States Con-
gress should recommend that states adopt uniform consent and coun-
seling requirements similar to those recommended or in place in the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada. All assisted repro-
ductive technology programs with preembryos stored in laboratories
certified under the Fertility Act should be required to inform patients
that joint agreement will be required for any disposition, including
destruction, research, donation, or implantation. The certification re-
quirements should also direct physicians to educate IVF patients that
no court has yet awarded "custody" of the preembryos to someone
who wants to implant them against the wishes of the other gamete
donor. Finally, the uniform counseling material should outline treat-
ment options that implicate only the rights of one gamete donor and
direct the patients to discuss the feasibility of those options with the
treating physician. This counseling requirement would respect physi-
cian autonomy, as such information would supplement and not re-
place the information a physician would normally share with her pa-
tients
Including the legal risks of a medical treatment and options
minimizing those risks falls right in line with the principle of in-
formed consent that patients should be able to "evaluate knowledgea-
181 See DEREK MORGAN & ROBERT G. LEE, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE HUMAN FER-
TILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY ACT OF 1990: ABORTION & EMBRYO RESEARCH, THE NEW LAW
222 (1991) (stating that "consent to the storage of ... [the] embryo must specify the maximum
period of storage, and... the conditions subject to which the ... embryos may remain in stor-
age") (quoting The Embryology Act Schedule 3 2.2(a)-(b)); ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW RE-
PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 157, at 598. Braake, supra note 174, at 112 (quoting
the Committee as recommending that brochures covering a uniform list of issues be made avail-
able to all couples who undergo infertility treatment).
182 ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCrIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 157, at 598.
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bly the options available and the risks attendant upon each."'' 8 3 A
court decision refusing to award the preembryos to someone who
wishes to implant them would prevent a patient from exercising a
medical option. This refusal could be classified as a risk substantially
affecting treatment because it has the potential actually to alter the
course of the infertility treatment. To truly make an informed knowl-
edgeable decision, a patient should be presented with all risks, both
legal and medical, with the potential to alter the original treatment
plan.
The existing Fertility Act is an appropriate vehicle to effect a uni-
form consent requirement because the federal guideline recognizes
the national impact of the infertility industry, while state implementa-
tion of those guidelines respects state power to regulate health care.
The national impact of the fertility industry is exemplified by the
"multistate infertility chains [that] have ... begun to spring up.''184
Statistics from the CDC also indicate that the majority of fertility clin-
ics are located on the East Coast near large urban centers. 8 5 This
geographic concentration makes it likely that an infertile couple
would travel from a rural, less populated state to receive treatment at
an urban fertility clinic. This interstate travel coupled with the pres-
ence of multistate chains illustrates the national effects of an infertil-
ity clinic in a single state. Federal recommendations would acknowl-
edge these national effects and ensure that gamete donors have equal
access to the information necessary to make an informed choice about
preembryo storage.
Some general criticisms of federal regulation of fertility clinics
are that (1) fertility clinics are too "diverse" and "diffuse" for a single
federal agency to monitor, and (2) that such regulation intrudes on the
tradition of self-regulation by physicians. 186  Although the CDC
monitors the success rates and identity of the certified laboratories,
individual state agencies would retain the burden of actually monitor-
183 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
184 Keith Alan Beyers, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization: A Growing Need for Con-
sumer-Oriented Regulation of the In Vitro Fertilization Industry, 18 J. LEG. MED. 265, 287
(1997).
185 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 1998 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY (ART) SUCCESS RATES NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS
(2000), at http:lwww.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drhlarchivelart98.
186 See Daar, supra note 158, at 656 (describing the United States fertility industry as "di-
verse and diffuse, with centers populating nearly every state" and predicting that "[a]ny regula-
tory scheme that ... placed the burden of investigation and compliance with a single federal
agency, would probably fail for lack of manpower, resources, and a coordinated vision"); Id. at
658 (describing self-regulation of reproductive medicine as long-standing). See also JOHN YEH
& MOLLY ULINE YEH, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INFERTILITY 16 (1991) (stating that "professional
medical associations regulate the practice of infertility by recommending guidelines for prac-
tice").
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ing the laboratories for compliance with the certification require-
ments. Multiple state agencies would better reflect the diversity of
fertility clinics and improve monitoring. Incorporating a uniform
counseling requirement into the existing Fertility Act also respects the
tradition of self-regulation in the medical community. Historically,
reform in the medical community has been accomplished by "provid-
ing incentives to those who control the industry to act in a responsible
manner. '87 Compliance with the Fertility Act is voluntary, leaving
the ultimate decision to physicians. The incentive for physicians to
comply with the Fertility Act is having the laboratories classified as
certified to the public. Requiring uniform counseling information un-
der the Fertility Act implements change based on an incentive rather
than a mandatory requirement; it therefore follows the traditional
means of effecting reform in the medical community.
The Fertility Act has also been criticized for being a "voluntary
system" with "no teeth., 18 8 Federal endorsement of uniform counsel-
ing information would still limit disputes and protect the moral right
to genetic procreation even if states choose not to adopt the guide-
lines. One commentator suggested that "[tihe advantages of federal
involvement [in regulating the fertility industry] include a centralized
forum for discussing reproductive techniques which would draw na-
tional attention in a way that debates within state legislatures would
fail to do."189 Including counseling provisions within the federal
guidelines would provide individual physicians and self-regulatory
groups like the American Fertility Society with additional information
about the legal consequences of preembryo preservation and storage.
The dialogue and debate accompanying the modification of the fed-
eral recommendations could lead physicians to incorporate the rec-
ommended information into counseling sessions even if the state did
not require them to do so. This enhanced awareness of the legal con-
sequences of preembryo storage would result in minimization of dis-
putes by creating better-educated physicians and patients able to make
truly informed treatment decisions.
The legislature could also attempt to curtail preembryo disputes
by standardizing storage time along with consent requirements. The
primary benefit of cryopreservation, extended viability for the preem-
bryo, also contributes subsiantially to the disputes between divorcing
couples. It is during this time of extended viability that the birth of a
87 Daar, supra note 158, at 657.
188 Joan Szabo, Embryology Labs May See Stiffer Regulations, MED. LAB. OBSERVER,
November 1, 1999, at 18.
189 Meena Lal, The Role of the Federal Government in Assisted Reproductive Technolo-
gies, 13 COMPUTER & HIGHTECH. LI. 517,542 (1997).
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child or subsequent remarriage occurs, thus creating circumstances so
changed that one partner no longer wishes to have any of the preem-
bryos implanted. Adopting the Canadian and European approach of
limiting the storage time for preembryos may be a remedy for this
problem.
The Canadian Royal Commission was the most liberal in its ap-
proach, recommending that eggs not be stored for more than five
years. 19° Austria, Sweden, and Denmark all prohibit embryos from
being stored for more than one year and from being donated. 191
Germany is the most restrictive by prohibiting the fertilization of
more eggs than can be implanted in one cycle.' 92 The limitation in
storage time could curtail disputes by limiting the time available to
gamete donors to depart from the original position of desiring implan-
tation. The primary problem with this approach is that it minimizes
the medical benefits that come along with cryopreservation. Cryopre-
servation facilitates IVF by reducing the number of times a woman
has to undergo egg retrieval and allowing a woman to have a genetic
child even after egg production ceases. 193 The number of egg retrieval
cycles may not be minimized when storage time is limited to one
year. A woman who desires several children would have to undergo a
new cycle of retrieval with each pregnancy attempt because only one
pregnancy per year is possible. If the preembryos are stored until
they lose viability, a woman may be able to achieve several pregnan-
cies from one round of IVF. The one-year limit on storage time
would also prevent some women from having a genetic child after
egg production ceases. If a woman's egg production ceased more
than one year after the original storage, then she would not be able to
use the stored preembryos for implantation or undergo any subse-
quent cycles of egg retrieval.
Finally, limiting the length of storage time to one year does not
guarantee that no disputes will arise during that time. In Davis, for
example, the last eggs were fertilized less than ninety days before the
husband filed for divorce. 194 A one-year limitation clearly would not
have prevented the dispute in Davis. The benefit of limiting storage
time, minimizing the time available for changed circumstances and
disputes, is not significant or certain enough to outweigh the medical
190 See ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 157, at
602.
191 See Linda Nielson, Legal Consensus and Divergence in Europe in the Area of Assisted
Conception-Room for Harmonization?, in CREATING THE CHILD 305, 306-08 (Donald Evans
ed., 1996) (discussing the prohibitive legislation approach to IVF).
192 See id. at 306.
193 See Coleman, supra note 8, at 60.
194 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,592 (Tenn. 1992).
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consequences of limiting storage time. Congress, therefore, should
not incorporate a uniform limit for storage time into the Fertility Act.
Such a decision is best left for individual patients and physicians to
determine.
CONCLUSION
As the use of IVF and other assisted reproductive technologies
rapidly increases, legal disputes implicating the rights to procreate
and to avoid procreation will continue to grow at the same pace. This
trend is evident in the pattern of state court decisions addressing
preembryo disputes. In the year 2000, there were more preembryo
disputes decided than had been decided during the preceding eight
years. The recent increase in these disputes necessitates the develop-
ment of a legal framework that respects the moral status of the
preembryos while still considering the procreative rights of both gam-
ete donors. The inalienable rights approach respects the moral status
of the preembryos by placing their disposition in the same category as
other decisions that create intimate family relationships. The refusal
to allow implantation of a preembryo against the wishes of a gamete
donor in any circumstance respects that the right to avoid procreation
is a constitutionally protected fundamental right. The incorporation
of uniform counseling requirements into existing legislation would
allow gamete donors to adequately protect their interests in genetic
procreation and acknowledge that society considers the right to assis-
tance in genetic procreation an important moral right. These three
approaches taken together provide a framework for deciding preem-
bryo disputes in a manner that respects the moral status of the preem-
bryo and protects individual procreative liberty.
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